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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 
The Full-Belly Thesis: 
Should Economic Rights Take Priority 
Over Civil and Political Rights? 
Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa 
Rhoda Howard * 
What freedom has our subsistence farmer? He scratches a bare living from the 
soil provided the rains do not fail; his children work at his side without 
schooling, medical care, or even good feeding. Certainly he has freedom to 
vote and to speak as he wishes. But these freedoms are much less real to him 
than his freedom to be exploited. Only as his poverty is reduced will his 
existing political freedom become properly meaningful and his right to human 
dignity become a fact of human dignity.' 
-Julius K. Nyerere, President of Tanzania 
One man, one vote, is meaningless unless accompanied by the principle of 
"one man, one bread."2 
-Colonel Ignatius K. Acheampong, former Head of State, Ghana 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper will discuss the relationship between civil/political and 
economic/social/cultural rights (as they are defined in the International Bill 
of Human Rights 3) in sub-Saharan Africa. There is an on-going debate, 
especially in United Nations circles and in non-governmental organizations, 
* The author would like to thank Jack Donnelly for his comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper. 
1. Julius K. Nyerere, "Stability and Change in Africa" (an Address to the University of 
Toronto, 1969), printed in Africa Contemporary Record 2 (1969-70), C30-31. 
2. Amnesty International, "Background Paper on Ghana" (London: mimeo, 1974), 9. 
3. The International Bill of Human Rights comprises the Universal Declaration of Human 
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as to whether the separate sets of rights embodied in the two 1966 
Covenants on human rights are intrinsically related, such that they must be 
developed and enlarged simultaneously, or whether, on the other hand, 
one set of rights takes priority over the other. Are they, in other words, 
sequential or interactive?4 Many spokespeople for Third World countries 
maintain that economic, social, and cultural, but especially "economic" 
rights (usually meant as the right to development) must take priority over 
civil and political rights.5s In the Western world, on the other hand, the 
assumption is sometimes made that civil and political rights must take prior- 
ity over economic rights. 
Both of the quotations opening this paper imply that economic rights to 
"basic needs"6 are more important than civil and political rights. Both imply 
that civil and political rights can wait until basic economic needs are 
secured. Yet the same position is shared by two very different African 
leaders. Despite violations of civil and political rights in Tanzania7 Julius 
Nyerere is known as a man deeply committed to improving the lot of Tan- 
zania's people. Ignatius Acheampong, on the other hand, was, before his 
overthrow in 1978 and his execution in 1979,8 the archetypical autocratic, 
corrupt, military dictator. Is the argument that civil/political liberties may be 
suspended in favor of economic rights in underdeveloped African countries 
a reflection of basic economic and human needs, or is it a self-serving 
justification for the centralized power of an elite? May civil and political 
rights ever justifiably be suspended, even in the pursuit of economic justice 
and equality? 
I will address this debate using evidence from a number of (formerly and 
presently) English-speaking countries in sub-Saharan Africa, namely Sierra 
Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.9 I 
will argue that suspension of civil and political rights in these countries until 
after economic development has been achieved will in effect mean that 
neither development nor rights will be attained. The argument for postpone- 
ment is that economic development must be achieved before political liber- 
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Interna- 
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Optional Protocol pertaining to the 
last covenant. (United Nations, New York: Office of Public Information, 1978). 
4. Reginald H. Green, "Basic Human Rights/Needs: Some Problems of Categorical Transla- 
tion and Unification," The Review (International Commission of jurists), nos. 24-27, 
(1980-81), 55. 
5. See Jack Donnelly, "Recent Trends in UN Human Rights Activity: Description and 
Polemic," International Organization 35 (Autumn 1981), 633-55. 
6. See, e.g., Paul Streeten, "Basic Needs and Human Rights," World Development 8 (1980), 
107-11. 
7. See Amnesty International, Annual Reports, pages on Tanzania, and other Al documen- 
tation. 
8. Africa Contemporary Record 11 (1978-79), B617. 
9. These countries were chosen because of their similarities in colonial background and 
social structures. See Howard, 'The Dilemma of Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa," 
International Journal 35 (Autumn 1980), 724. 
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ties are allowed. A rather narrow functionalist perspective is adopted; 
economic development is taken as a goal, and civil and political rights are 
discussed as means which might or might not result in economic develop- 
ment. Civil/political rights are seldom considered as goals in and of 
themselves, although social and cultural rights are considered as goals, 
especially in Africa. In this paper, I will discuss civil/political rights both as 
means to ends and as goals in themselves, arguing specifically three points: 
1. That civil and political rights are needed in order to implement reasonable 
development policies and to ensure equitable distribution fwealth, as well 
as economic growth. 
2. That civil and political rights are needed in order to guarantee social and 
cultural rights (and the maintenance ofa stable social order which is necessary 
for society itself to exist). 
3. That civil and political rights are needed in and of themselves; that is, that 
even at the lowest levels of economic development, some people need and 
want individual freedom. 
In making this argument I recognize that I am in fact addressing only 
one side of the larger international debate. I am not arguing that civil and 
political rights must take priority over economic, social, and cultural rights; 
the two sets of rights are interactive, not sequential. I agree with Shue's posi- 
tion that economic subsistence ought to be a basic right.10 Within Africa, 
however, the right to subsistence is now taken for granted (theoretically) 
whereas rights to physical security and those civil and political freedoms 
which are necessary for effective political participation are problematic. 
Often, the position that subsistence rights must take priority over civil/ 
political rights is taken solely for rhetorical purposes to perpetuate the 
political monopoly of a self-serving elite. Against such an elite, one needs to 
consider the meaning of civil and political freedoms for the poor and unfree 
masses. 
Au fond, the debate over priorities or non-priorities of civil/political vs. 
economic human rights is a debate about human nature. The "full-belly" 
thesis is that a man's belly must be full before he can indulge in the "luxury" 
of worrying about his political freedoms. Yet there is an alternate view that 
human dignity, or perhaps "self-respect,"" is a fundamental requirement of 
human nature. In an earlier paper I argued that "[a]ll human beings need a 
certain sense of dignity or autonomy. To achieve such dignity, each individ- 
ual needs a certain amount of order, physical security, and personal free- 
dom."12 In this paper, I will enlarge on this initial proposition about human 
10. Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), chap. 1. 
11. Christian Bay, "Self-Respect as a Human Right: Thoughts on the Dialectics of Wants and 
Needs in the Struggle for Human Community," Human Rights Quarterly 4 (Spring 1982), 
53-75. 
12. Howard, note 9 above, 725. 
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nature, arguing that economic, social-cultural, and civil-political rights are all 
valued by individuals, even at very low levels of economic development. 
II. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ARE NECESSARY FOR 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 
According to Meltzer, there are two competing paradigms of how civil/ 
political rights and economic development interact in the Third World: 
Development requires significant economic growth and social stability. 
Such growth and stability often require limiting civil and political rights. 
Therefore, development often requires the limitation ofcivil liberties and political 
participation to succeed. 
or 
Development requires active participation f people and the fulfillment ofbasic 
economic and social needs to be effective. 
Deprivation of civil and political rights and human eeds destroys that possibility. 
Therefore, failure to provide for human rights and basic needs makes develop- 
ment impossible.13 
Which paradigm one considers correct depends to a large extent on one's 
definition of the term "development." Most serious discussions of develop- 
ment in Africa refer to some combination of absolute growth, redistribution 
of wealth in a more egalitarian manner, and increased national autonomy or 
self-sufficiency, as for example in the rhetoric of "African socialism" in 
Kenya,14 of "ujamaa" in Tanzania,1s and of "humanism" in Zambia.'6 For such 
development, civil and political liberties are necessary both to ensure that 
proper development policies are implemented and inappropriate policies 
changed, and to ensure that wealth is distributed equitably among all a 
country's citizens. Such civil and political rights are necessary to ensure that 
political participation is effective as well as active; that is, that ordinary 
people's wishes are communicated to political leaders and that they actually 
affect policy. As Hayward remarks: 
Participation f this sort-participation which is designed to be instrumental - is 
seldom tried. 
.... 
This is because of failures at various leadership levels or, more 
13. Ron I. Meltzer, "International Human Rights and Development: Evolving Conceptions 
and their Application to EC-ACP Relations," in Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Ron I. Meltzer, 
eds., Human Rights and Development in Africa (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, forthcoming 
1983). 
14. Republic of Kenya, African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya (G.P.K. 
3938-5m-12/65) (1965), especially "Statement by the President," and "Objectives of 
Societies," 1-2. 
15. See Julius K. Nyerere, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism (London: Oxford University Press, 
1968), esp. chap. 2, "'The Arusha Declaration." 
16. Kenneth D. Kaunda, "Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to its Implementation" (Lusaka: 
Zambian Information Service, 1968), esp. chap. 5. 
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often, because it is not allowed to be effective. Those in power feel that they have 
too much at stake to delegate or share their authority ... .17 
According to the first paradigm quoted above, economic stability 
requires cessation of civil and political freedoms. There is some truth to the 
argument that African nation-states are very fragile, and that ethnic, 
linguistic, or regional particularisms might threaten their political existence,'8 
hence also their economic integrity. A country might become so involved in 
political competition that nothing else gets done; suppose, for example, that 
the Nigerian Electoral Commission had not reduced that country's original 
nineteen political parties to five national parties in 1979.'9 But in sub- 
Saharan English-speaking Africa the problem is not too much political 
freedom; rather, it is that, with the present exception of Nigeria, there is so 
little political freedom that economic development policies must evolve in 
an intellectual vacuum; a vacuum, moreover, that ensures the continued 
privilege of the ruling elite. 
There is no known successful model of economic development which 
can be applied without substantial modification to sub-Saharan Africa. 
African states cannot imitate the development history of the Western world, 
with its empires and col6nies. Nor do African states have the centralized 
bureaucracies and nationalist sentiments which aided Russia and China. 
Small, ethnically diverse states with mixed economies, such as Yugoslavia, 
are probably the closest models which African countries could follow. But 
no model is perfect. Comprehensive economic policy-making, therefore, 
requires flexibility and freedom of debate, as well as a real understanding of 
African complexities, rather than ideological myths whether of right or left. 
Yet in Africa, economic policies are often made by executive fiat, with no 
room for debate; such decisions often result in dramatic swings in policies 
when failures must finally be rectified, or in interference by multilateral lend- 
ing agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (resulting, for exam- 
ple, in political conflict over the price of rice in Sierra Leone in 1981 20 after 
the IMF urged that food subsidies be removed). Nowhere are the effects of 
poor planning more tragic than in food production and distribution. 
Tanzania, for example, is now an importer of maize, in which it was 
formerly self-sufficient. One reason for its deficiency may be that until 
recently the government paid so little for maize that producers were encour- 
aged to sell in the black market.21 Moreover, in pursuit of the socialist 
egalitarianism of ujamaa, Nyerere's government expropriated thirty-five 
17. Fred M. Hayward, "Political Participation and its Role in Development: Some Observa- 
tions Drawn from the African Context," Journal of Developing Areas 7 (July 1973), 610. 18. Howard, note 9 above, 738-42. 
19. Africa Contemporary Record, 11 (1978-79), B730. 20. West Africa, 24 August 1981, 1911. See also Emmanuel Hansen, "Public Policy and the 
Food Question in Ghana," Afrique et Developpement 6 (1981), 99. 
21. Carl K. Eicher, "Facing up to Africa's Food Crisis," Foreign Affairs 61 (Fall 1982), 160. 
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large-scale African farmers producing about thirty percent of the country's 
marketed maize supply in the early 1970s.22 Most tragic of all, the forced 
"villagization" policy of 1973-75, which affected about two million people, 
resulted in a severe drop in maize production, as hostile, suspicious peasants 
refused to plant in their new homesteads. The results to the national 
economy were devastating, as massive amounts of foreign exchange had to 
be diverted from importation of other necessary items-such as industrial 
components-to food.23 By disallowing debate about ujamaa,24 Nyerere 
does not permit rational consideration of the possible negative economic 
effects of his policies. 
In Ghana, cocoa production has significantly declined because of the 
government's underpayment of producers through its state monopoly Cocoa 
Marketing Board. While the cities are crowded with unemployed youths, 
the cocoa farms lack labor.25 Even basic food production is suffering. In the 
mid-1970s, the government of Colonel Acheampong launched an "Opera- 
tion Feed Yourself" program to try to return to food self-sufficiency. Under 
this program, heavy agricultural machinery was imported, yet there was so 
severe a shortage of cutlasses, the basic low-technology agricultural imple- 
ment, that they were being distributed personally by Regional Commis- 
sioners (state governors). By 1978, seventy percent of Ashanti farmers in one 
survey said they did not grow enough food to feed their families.26 All of 
these failed policies were instituted under a rhetorical commitment to pro- 
vide for the basic economic rights of Ghanaian citizens. It is difficult to 
understand, however, how such basic rights were furthered by the 1975 
imprisonment of J. H. Mensah, the Minister of Finance under the civilian 
regime of Kofi Busia (1969-72), simply because he had distributed a pam- 
phlet calling for debate of Acheampong's economic policies.27 
Similar examples abound. Kenyan businessmen have twice been 
ordered by the President o increase the total number of their employees by 
ten percent. While alleviating unemployment, such irrational investment 
may not necessarily redound to the ultimate economic betterment of the 
country. The policy has also resulted in repression of trade unions, and 
strikes were banned in December 1978,28 presumably because employers 
22. Africa Contemporary Record 4 (1971-72), B207. 
23. Michael F. Lofchie, "Agrarian Crisis and Economic Liberalisation i  Tanzania," Journal of 
Modern African Studies 16 (1978), 451-75. 
24. Ibid., 474. 
25. Donald Rothchild, "Ghana's Economy: an African Test Case for Political Democracy: 
President Limann's Economic Alternatives," Africa Contemporary Record 12 (1979-80), 
A139. 
26. Hansen, note 20 above, 100-101. 
27. Amnesty International, Annual Report, 1975-1976, "Ghana." Mensah was released in 
1978 following the internal military coup against Acheampong. See also Amnesty Inter- 
national, Bulletin (January 1977), 3. 
28. Africa Contemporary Record 3 (1970-71), 8118, and ibid., 11 (1978-79), B275. 
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would be unwilling to grant pay raises in the face of wage bills already 
increased by ten percent. Nor is state capitalism necessarily a solution. In 
sub-Saharan Africa, vast sectors of the economies of Zambia, Tanzania, and 
Ghana (depending on the regime) have come under control of "parastatal" 
corporations. This has occurred despite the fact that sub-Saharan Africa is an 
area with very little human capital. As a result partly of colonial educational 
policies, and partly of initial non-development and non-scientific cultural 
traditions, very few people with any real expertise were ready to take over 
African economies at independence. When the Zambian copper mines 
were nationalized in 1970, for example, Kaunda became chairman of the 
board of directors and his political allies became fellow directors;29 it is 
doubtful if any of these people had much expertise or experience in mining. 
At the same time, indigenous, small-scale African entrepreneurs who do 
have experience and knowledge of local conditions are pushed out of 
business by state policies. Under the first Rawlings regime in Ghana, the 
large Accra markets run by women traders were destroyed, yet the state did 
not have the administrative, transport, and distributive capacity to replace 
the services these women performed.30. In Zambia, state corporations are in 
so much difficulty that even the large trade union congress supports a "move 
to the right" back to increased economic liberalism.31 In Tanzania, small 
private enterprise is once again being encouraged, and parastatal 
monopolies are being informed that if they are not profitable, they can no 
longer expect to be subsidized by the central government.32 
The point here is not to argue that nationalizations, especially of large- 
scale foreign-owned enterprise, are necessarily unwise economic policies 
for sub-Saharan African states. The point, rather, is that both comparative 
literature and the historical experience of Africa teaches us that continued 
input by those affected is necessary to ensure that economic policies are 
effective. Strong central control of the economy may well be necessary in 
poor countries which are striving for rapid development within an inequi- 
table world economy. But such strength is not contingent upon inflexibility. 
Rather, it is contingent upon a willingness and ability to make constant 
adjustments in policy, and to respond to unexpected difficulties which 
emerge. Input from the base, in a system of political participation in which 
genuine free discussion is permitted, is necessary so that economic planners 
can make such adjustments. Civil and political freedoms of association, 
speech, and press are necessary to permit such input. "A favorable environ- 
ment for civil and political rights can serve to reinforce public policies 
29. Ibid., 3 (1970-71), B222. 
30. Nii K. Bentsi-Enchill, "Destruction of Accra's Makola Market," West Africa, 27 August 
1979, 1539-41. 
31. Wall Street Journal, 21 October 1981, 31E, "Unions Oppose Zambia's Leftist Path," and 
New York Times, 1 November 1981, 17, "Zambian Unionists Opposing Kaunda." 
32. Lofchie, note 23 above, 459. 
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leading to a better distribution of economic benefits responsive to public 
and private needs."33 
In this context, then (assuming, for the sake of argument, that good faith 
is intended in planning), I suggest that the costs of not allowing civil/political 
freedoms of effective participation will far exceed the costs of allowing them. 
Surely it is more economically rational to allow peasants to lobby for 
increased prices for their cocoa or maize than to force them onto the black 
market or into smuggling. In the long run, the costs of such major blunders 
as food underproduction are extremely high in both economic and political 
terms. When peasants and workers find all avenues of political participation 
and criticism blocked, they can easily fall prey to populist demagoguery. 
Many ordinary people originally supported Idi Amin's expulsion of the 
Ugandan Asians, for example, as many ordinary people supported the 1979 
Rawlings "revolution" in Ghana (although support for Rawlings' second revo- 
lution lessened throughout 1982 as he failed to "deliver the goods"). Such 
populist revolutions, led by military officers, have even fewer intellectual 
resources for development at their command than the civilian governments 
which preceded them; thus a circle is set up of coup, counter-coup, and 
spurious revolution, and economies such as Ghana's and Uganda's are run 
into the ground. Economic policy by executive fiat in sub-Saharan Africa is 
not merely undemocratic: it is severely detrimental to long-run economic 
development. 
Furthermore, insofar as Africa lacks human capital, it is unwise to 
alienate those experts it does have by consistently violating their rights to 
freedom of expression. Those people who are best equipped with the exper- 
tise necessary to implement development policies are also those who are 
least likely to keep quiet when they see errors being made. Yet governments 
often react to criticism from academics by closing down universities, 
sometimes for considerable periods of time.34 Professors who are exiled or 
jailed cannot contribute to economic development. There has, for example, 
been a flight of professionals from Ghana in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
partly as a result of political repression and partly because poor economic 
planning contributed, with worsening world economic conditions, to a 
severe decline in their standard of living. Furthermore, students who are 
expelled from a university or whose education is interrupted (in many disci- 
plines, irrevocably) are a national disinvestment. Countries with very little 
33. American Association for the International Commission of Jurists, Toward an Integrated 
Human Rights Policy (New York: 1979), 6. See also the statement by Shridath S. 
Ramphal in International Commission of Jurists, Development, Human Rights and the 
Rule of Law (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), 22: "Only if criticism is seen as fun- 
damental to a healthy society- rather than as being subversive of it- are decisions likely 
to be taken that are so sufficiently informed by the public will as to be supportive of the 
public interest." 
34. For information on closings of universities, see Colin Legum, "The Year of the Students," 
Africa Contemporary Record 4 (1971-72), A12. 
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human capital cannot afford to alienate those who possess knowledge in the 
interests of party loyalty or of spurious consistency of development policy, 
especially considering that elite individuals can also foment coups d'etat. 
Originally mass-based political regimes can become narrowed into cliquish 
control of the organs of state (as, I suggest, would probably have happened 
in Zambia [1980 and 81] 35 and Kenya [1982] had the attempted coups in 
those countries succeeded). Again, the long-run costs of denial of political 
participation are both the inefficient implementation of economic policies, 
and the undermining of what little political freedom exists by even more 
repressive successor regimes. 
So far, this discussion has assumed that economic policies are for- 
mulated in good faith; that is, that the rhetoric of national development is 
what impels economic decisions. This assumption is, of course, erroneous. 
A serious analysis of the relationships between civil/political and economic 
human rights must confront the fact that sub-Saharan African societies, like 
all other societies, are stratified by social class, and that the elites who for- 
mulate economic policy may well be doing so in their own interests, not in 
the interests of the malnourished masses.36 Many Third World elite 
spokespeople are highly supportive of the proposed policies of the New 
International Economic Order, which deals with inequalities among nation- 
states, but quite touchy about the "basic needs" development proposals, 
which deal with inequalities within nation-states.37 In some countries, cor- 
ruption among such elites is rampant. The Kenyatta family, for example, 
apparently profited substantially from Jomo Kenyatta's executive powers 
until his death in 1978. Criticisms of their economic power in British 
newspapers resulted in the papers being seized in Kenya in 1975.38 
One means by which elites benefit from their economic power is land 
policy. In Malawi, Life President H. Kamuzu Banda proudly parades his 
wealth and large estate holdings before his people as an example of what 
Africans can do.39 in Ghana, senior civil servants and army officers bene- 
fitted from state credit programs for farmers in the late 1970s; one result of 
this has been that absentee capitalist rice farming has displaced traditional 
peasant agriculture (producing basic food needs) in the Northern and Upper 
35. There were alleged attempted coups in Zambia on 20 October 1980 (Keesing's Contem- 
porary Archives, 27 February 1981, 30738) and in June 1981 (Keesing's Contemporary 
Archives, 13 November 1981, 31185). 
36. For discussions of class formation in Africa, see Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of Basic 
Needs: Urban Aspects of Assaulting Poverty in Africa (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1982), esp. chaps. 4-5, and numerous articles on the subject in the Review of 
African Political Economy. 
37. Johan Galtung, "The New International Economic Order and the Basic Needs 
Approach," Alternatives 4 (1978-79), 470. 
38. Africa Contemporary Record 7 (1974-75), B203. 
39. Malawi Government, His Excellency the Life President's Speeches, Lilongwe 3-12 
September 1971 (Zomba: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1972), "His Excel- 
lency the Life President Speaks to Businessmen, Lilongwe, 4 September 1971." 
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Regions.40 Control of office can be enough to obtain wealth. In an unusual 
trial resulting from allegations of corruption in Zambia in 1972, a number of 
top civil servants were revealed to have obtained large tracts of land through 
a credit scheme intended, again, for local farmers.41 In Nigeria, control of 
office allows members of the elite to obtain payments from multinational 
and national contractors in the booming oil economy,42 but some check on 
such corruption is provided by a democratic parliament and a relatively free 
press.43 
Thus any attempt to implement the economic rights or basic human 
needs of the poor in sub-Saharan Africa requires consistent participation by 
them. In an administrative sense, such participation is needed to prevent 
errors from being made. In a political sense, such participation is needed to 
protect their interests. The freedom of trade unions to organize and strike 
forces elites to concede higher wages; it may also be that all workers benefit 
through national wage settlements, as under the Adebo or Udoji Commis- 
sions in Nigeria,44 or that an articulate organized opposition to the 
entrenched government is formed, as is true of the Zambia Congress of 
Trade Unions.45 Political organization of peasants is also necessary, so that 
they are not exploited through state marketing boards in order to feed the 
politically volatile urban masses and the growing middle class.46 The right to 
organize is essential to such oppressed groups. So is the right to vote, even if 
in one party elections, so as to elect their own representatives. The rate of 
defeat of members of Kenya's only political party, Kenya Africa National 
Union,47 for example, shows that the ordinary people do take elections 
seriously. Freedom of the press is also essential; that African governments 
realize the political challenge posed by freedom of the press, despite their 
contention that such freedom is a luxury in largely illiterate populations, is 
clear from the amount of censorship of newspapers, books, and theatre 
which they in fact perpetrate.48 
40. Hansen, note 20 above, 102, 110. 
41. Republic of Zambia, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Allegations made by 
Mr. Justin Chimba and Mr. John Chisata (Lusaka: Government Printer, May 1971), 5-6. 
42. See, e.g., Terisa Turner, "Multinational Corporations and the Instability of the Nigerian 
State," Review of African Political Economy 5 (lanuary 1976), 63-79. 
43. See the numerous reports of corruption trials in Nigeria in Africa Contemporary Record 
8-12. 
44. Africa Contemporary Record 4 (1971-72), B647, and ibid., 7 (1974-75), B746. 
45. See, e.g., Africa Contemporary Record, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, and New York 
Times reports on Zambia, 1980-82. 
46. Michael F. Lofchie, "Political and Economic Origins of African Hunger," Journal of 
Modern African Studies 13 (1975), 564. 
47. For example, in 1970 almost half of the sitting members were defeated; Africa Contem- 
porary Record 2 (1969-70), B127; in 1974, 4 Ministers, 13 Assistant Ministers, and 71 
backbenchers were defeated, ibid., 7 (1974-75), 8198. 
48. Consistent reporting on censorship in Africa can be found in Index on Censorship 
(London) and the International Press Institute Report. 
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In any case, historically speaking, the assumption that civil and political 
rights emerged only after "basic human needs," or economic rights, had 
already been fulfilled in the Western world is erroneous. In a brilliant article 
discussing violations of human rights in nineteenth-century Europe, Gold- 
stein shows that major political battles between the proletariat and the ruling 
elite occurred over the right to suffrage, the right to freedom of the press and 
speech, and the right to freedom of association. In 1900, the literacy rate in 
Britain, one of the less repressive European countries, was ninety percent, 
but male life expectancy was a mere forty-eight years and the infant mortal- 
ity rate was one hundred thirty per thousand; both these latter figures resem- 
ble figures in sub-Saharan Africa today. Goldstein concludes that in Europe 
"political repression, by blocking out popular participation, enabled regimes 
to persist while ignoring the vital human needs of their populations."49 
Other literature also shows that there is no clear connection between 
political authoritarianism and economic development. Hewlett, basing her 
argument mostly on Latin America, sees a positive connection between 
political repression and economic growth, but a negative connection 
between repression and "development," including redistribution.so50 Marsh, in 
a very complex cross-national study, cannot even find a connection 
between political authoritarianism and economic development as defined 
by increased use of energy; he finds the authoritarian model of development 
unproven.s5 Park finds a negative correlation between increased GNP and 
civil/political rights in Third World countries, but a positive correlation 
between physical quality of life and civil/political rights.52 Finally, in a com- 
parative study of the growth of welfare measures in Britain, Italy, France, and 
Germany, Hage and Hanneman conclude that the political variables are 
more important than the economic in introducing state welfarism.53 
But no discussion of the relationship between political rights and 
economic development is reasonable which does not consider the class 
aspects. When the costs of political participation are considered, the key 
costs are those to the already entrenched elite. It is interesting, for example, 
that although African leaders consider civil/political rights to be irrelevant o 
49. Robert Justin Goldstein, "Political Repression and Political Development: The 'Human 
Rights' Issue in Nineteenth Century Europe," in Richard F. Tomasson, ed., Comparative 
Social Research 4 (Greenwich, Conn.: Jai Press, 1981), 193-94 (emphasis added). 
50. Sylvia Ann Hewlett, "Human Rights and Economic Realities: Tradeoffs in Historical 
Perspective," Political Science Quarterly 94 (Fall 1979), 471. 
51. Robert M. Marsh, "Does Democracy Hinder Economic Development in the Latecomer 
Developing Nations?," in Richard F. Tomasson, ed., Comparative Social Research 2 
(Greenwich, Conn.: Jai Press, 1979), 243. 
52. Han S. Park, "Human Rights and Modernization: A Dialectical Relationship?," Universal 
Human Rights 2 (January-March 1980), 91. 53. Jerald Hage and Robert A. Hanneman, 'The Growth of the Welfare State in Britain, 
France, Germany and Italy; A Comparison of Three Paradigms," in Richard F. Tomasson, 
ed., Comparative Social Research 3 (Greenwich, Conn.: Jai Press, 1980), 63. 
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the development effort, they only consider them irrelevant when they are 
absent. That actual exercise of such freedoms is not irrelevant, is forcefully 
shown by the abridgements of civil liberties which result when the 
economic privilege of elites is attacked. The "right to development," touted 
by African elites as a prerequisite to the more traditional human rights, may 
well be merely a cover for denial of those basic civil and political liberties 
which will allow the dispossessed masses to act in their own interests. To 
wait for economic development, including a "basic needs" oriented 
redistribution of wealth, to occur before allowing for civil and political liber- 
ties is to invite the possibility that such redistribution will never occur. Even 
in socialist societies, elites entrench and perpetuate themselves. Without 
human rights, the evidence suggests, economic growth may occur but 
economic development will not. "Full bellies" require political participation 
and civil liberties. 
III. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ARE NECESSARY TO 
PRESERVE SOCIAL ORDER, AND SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
In the introduction to this paper I noted that the position that civil/political 
liberties can be left in abeyance until basic economic rights are secured is 
based on a view of human nature which assumes that the individual whose 
belly is not full has no interest in dignity, self-respect, or personal freedoms. I 
believe, rather, that while individuals need physical security (both physical 
integrity and economic subsistence), they also need a sense of social order 
and of belonging to that social order; that is, a sense of belonging expressed 
in their cultural, linguistic, and ethnic ties to their community. 
Interestingly, those rights which would preserve the peoples' sense of 
belonging to a community, of having the self-respect which comes from 
fulfilling one's role in society, are guaranteed, in international law, not in the 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant of 1966, but in the Civil and 
Political Rights Covenant. Especially important is Article 27, guaranteeing to 
minorities the right "to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their 
own religion ... [and] to use their own language." Both the 1966 Covenants 
also contain Articles54 protecting the family. These rights are the basis for the 
protection of the community against the centralized, bureaucratic State. 
They are paralleled in the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights s 
by Article 17(2) guaranteeing each individual the freedom to take part in the 
cultural life of his community, and 17(3) asserting that "the promotion and 
54. Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, art. 23 and Covenant of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, art. 10. 
55. Organization of African Unity, Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, printed in 
International Legal Materials 21 (January 1982), 58-68. 
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protection of morals and traditional values recognized by the community 
shall be the duty of the State," and by Article 18, protecting the family. That 
these rights, essential to the preservation of society and culture, actually are 
included in the Civil and Political, rather than in the Economic, Social and 
Cultural Covenant, shows the irrelevance of the legalistic separation of the 
two "kinds" of rights. 
Christian Bay believes that there is a fundamental human "need to 
belong and be accepted in a (nonexploitive) human community."s6 In this 
position he is supported by African philosophers who maintain that "person- 
hood" in Africa is attained by one's belonging to, and fulfilling one's role in, 
the community.57 There is strong sociological evidence to support these 
philosophical suppositions. In all known societies, similarities of social struc- 
ture create similar human beings with similar human "natures." These com- 
mon social structures include kinship systems which place each individual in 
society; rituals which reinforce the individual's ense of belonging; and basic 
systems of exchange, law and order, and legitimate authority which regulate 
the individual's relations with others within a mutually-recognized 
framework. Such a framework is a necessary part of the individual's environ- 
ment; its legitimacy and predictability offer him security in his everyday life. 
The sudden elimination of, or interference in, such structures can result in 
the destruction of entire communities, even if their individual members sur- 
vive in a physical sense. Therefore, it is the first duty of the emerging cen- 
tralized African state to preserve the basic organization of communal 
societies. 
South Africa is an example of a state which has systematically chal- 
lenged this fundamental evel of social existence, especially by its policies of 
splitting up families (by confining "superfluous appendages," such as the 
aged, children, and crippled to so-called homelands). In sub-Saharan 
English-speaking Africa, however, there has been no consistent policy of 
interference with basic social order. There is one example of a state's com- 
mitting such destruction by accident, as it were, rather than by policy. 
Under Idi Amin's regime in Uganda, the most basic, fundamental organiza- 
tion of society was seriously challenged. Law and order collapsed. Anyone 
who came to the attention of the five organs of supposed "state security" 
could be summarily kidnapped, tortured, and executed. Individuals could 
denounce personal enemies to such illegitimate authorities without fear of 
any check by national or local/communal organs of justice,58 By undermin- 
ing the social order at this most fundamental level, Amin's rule challenged 
56. Bay, note 11 above, 60. 
57. Ifeanyi A. Menkiti, "Person and Community in African Traditional Thought," in Richard 
A. Wright, ed., African Philosophy: An Introduction, 2d. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Univer- 
sity Press of America, 1979), 157-68. 
58. International Commission of Jurists, Uganda and Human Rights: Reports to the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights (Geneva: International Commission of jurists, 1977), 151. 
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the right to community, the right to belong to a stable, familiar social order 
which through its rituals and familiar laws and customs would provide the 
individual with a fulfillment of his or her need to belong. 
But Amin was the exception. Generally speaking, sub-Saharan English- 
speaking states have been not merely tolerant, but actively supportive, of the 
cultural and social rights which are implied in the right to belong or the right 
to community. Even in post-civil war Nigeria, the state attempted to con- 
ciliate the ethnic Ibo group which had seceded as Biafra, rather than to 
destroy it. Despite the temptation to persecute ethnic communities with 
strong irredentist or secessionist tendencies, such as the Ewe in Eastern 
Ghana, African governments have been surprisingly tolerant of ethnic (com- 
munity) peculiarities. 
The recognition of customary law and the role of "traditional chiefs" in 
sub-Saharan African countries is another means by which the right to com- 
munity is recognized. At the "municipal" level in Africa, elders and chiefs 
represent the community; the centralized state has not removed the tribal 
institutions of political representation. In certain types of legal cases (for 
example marriage and divorce), customary law, varying by ethnic commu- 
nity, is followed, and is adjudicated by chiefs and elders. Why the state in 
Africa has permitted the retention of such local systems of authority is not 
clear. The honoring of traditional society may simply be a reflection of the 
fact that the central state does not have the human expertise, or administra- 
tive/organizational capacity, to intrude upon peoples' everyday lives at the 
levels of customary law. For the moment, however, retention of customary 
legal and authority structures protects African peoples against disruptive 
modern bureaucracies. 
Indeed the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights lays great 
stress on the ideal of group rights, at the possible expense of individual 
human rights.59 Some critics, including Africans, suggest that the stress on 
peoples' rights is a means for the elite to manipulate the masses. Aluko, for 
example, states 
This emphasis on peoples' rights .., seems to be an attempt by African leaders to 
continue the near-autocratic control of their countries and the remorseless 
exploitation of their own peoples. ... [W]ho determines the peoples' rights and 
by what yard-stick? It is the tiny ruling class. ... Surely it is the case that without 
adequate rights for the individua! not much progress can be made, especially in 
the African context.6" 
59. For an analysis of the African Charter and how it differs from other international and 
regional human rights charters, see Richard Gittleman, "The Banjul Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis," forthcoming in Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Ron I. 
Meltzer, eds., Human Rights and Development in Africa (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 
1983). 
60. Olajide Aluko, "The Organization of African Unity and Human Rights," The Round Table 
283 (July 1981), 237. 
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Aluko's criticism points out the ambivalent nature of group rights. Certainly 
the assertion of group rights underlines the rights of distinct ethnic groups to 
live in peace, a right which is very important in such ethnically 
heterogeneous states as Nigeria, with its more than 250 linguistic groups. 
Group rights also permit the newly-emerging nation-state to protect itself 
against more powerful outsiders, for example multinational corporations. 
On the other hand, the idea of national or group rights has also been 
used in Africa to justify scapegoat politics, that is, the persecution of 
ethnically-distinct non-African minorities, especially the Asians in East 
Africa,61 and, less severely, the Lebanese in West Africa.62 There is a thin line 
between implementing equality of economic opportunity through African- 
ization policies, as the Kenyans have done through restricting the economic 
activities of non-citizen Asians,63 and implementing a xenophobic exclusion 
of ethnically identifiable groups. The affirmation of the right of ethnic or 
linguistic groups to exist may also mean the affirmation, at the level of the 
nation-state, of the right to discriminate against certain outsiders. 
The problem with the concept of group rights is that it fails to recognize 
that in modernizing, urbanizing Africa, people are less and less members of 
particular ethnic groups and more and more individuals with a multiplicity 
of associations. 
[Ilt is necessary to recognize the limits of the group approach to human rights. It 
works best where there exist clearly defined ethnic communities who carry on a 
life separate from the wider society. These groups exist most prominently in areas 
of economic underdevelopment where large-scale production and trade have 
not yet brought about economic integration. In larger, more complex economies 
and societies ... each individual belongs to a number of quite distinct groups all 
at once, and none is capable of representing all the individual's interests. It 
becomes more important to protect the individual's right to participate, or not to 
participate, in any of a variety of groups.64 
By emphasizing community rights, African governments have displayed 
sensitivity to the needs of those many rural Africans who still live in small- 
scale, homogeneous agricultural societies. The human dignity or self-respect 
of such individuals is guaranteed largely by the preservation of their com- 
munities and their sense of identity within them. However, to stress such 
61. Yash Tandon, 'The Asians in East Africa in 1972," Africa Contemporary Record 5 
(1972-73), A3-A19. See also the ongoing reports on the Asians in Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda in ibid. 
62. For example, people of Lebanese descent cannot become citizens in Sierra Leone, 
hence they cannot acquire land or engage in certain trades or businesses. Donald 
George and Garvas Betts, "Citizenship and Civil Rights in Sierra Leone" (unpublished, 
1980), 10-11. 
63. Africa Contemporary Record 1 (1968-69), 161; ibid., 6 (1973-74), B172; there are also 
reported harassments of citizen Asians, ibid., 9 (1976-77), 8235. 
64. John F. McCamant, "Social Science and Human Rights," International Organization 35 (Summer 1981), 542. 
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group rights over individual rights is to deny the reality that "strangers" or 
outsiders are now also part of large-scale, heterogeneous African nation- 
states; that individuals are increasingly mobile and alienated from their com- 
munal roots; and that, in complex modern cities, individuals need new sets 
of rights to protect them against large-scale, bureaucratic organizations, 
especially the organization of the state. 
The preservation of social/cultural rights of community, therefore, is not 
enough. Individual civil and political rights are also necessary. The large cen- 
tralized state cannot operate on the same lines as the small community. 
While the latter is relatively homogeneous and unstratified, the former is 
ethnically heterogeneous and increasingly stratified along lines of wealth, 
education, and control of office. While it is true that, for the most part, the 
state has not engaged in the systematic destruction of local ethnic groups in 
Africa, it is also true that competition for the scarce modern goods of wealth, 
education, and office is conducted in Africa partly along ethnic lines. In 
some cases, as in Amin's Uganda, membership of particular eligious groups 
is also important.65 The individual who is denied, for example, a university 
position because of his ethnicity needs to be able to demand his rights as an 
individual, even while his ethnic group as a collectivity is agitating for a new 
university in its own geographical region. Similarly, the changing social 
structure is resulting in new ideas about old roles. The individual woman 
worker needs to be able to demand equal pay for her equal work, even as 
her rural sister needs to be assured that her rights to land will not be 
abrogated by new legislation implementing individual and title, usually in 
men's names.66 All communal groups need means to defend themselves 
against encroaching power of the centralized state; each individual needs 
means to protect him/herself against violations of laws or discrimination in 
cases in which his/her original membership group is powerless, or unwilling, 
to act. 
IV. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ARE NECESSARY 
IN AND OF THEMSELVES 
In section II, I made the pragmatic argument that civil and political liberties 
will enhance the possibilities for economic development and equitable 
distribution of wealth. In this section I make a sociological argument, based 
65. M. Louise Pirouet, "Religion in Uganda under Amin," Journal of Religion in Africa 11 
(1980), 13-29. Although only about 5 percent of Ugandans are Muslim, Amin favored 
them over Christians; nevertheless, Muslim leaders also suffered along with Christian 
leaders under Amin's rule. 
66. Rhoda Howard, "Women's Rights in English-Speaking Sub-Saharan Africa," forthcoming 
in Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Ron I. Meltzer, eds., Human Rights and Development in 
Africa (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1983). 
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on empirical examples, that along with, or even prior to, economic security, 
ordinary people may wish to have the kinds of rights which we consider 
under the rubric of civil and political liberties. In some cases, ordinary 
people will "trade off" their full bellies for freedoms of a non-material nature. 
In making this argument, I am referring not to the fundamental security 
rights such as freedom from torture and arbitrary execution (which I take for 
granted are desired by all individuals), but to the less physically necessary 
rights of intellectual freedom and political participation. 
Some African scholars argue that the assertion that people need indi- 
vidual liberties such as freedom of expression or association is a Eurocentric 
position.67 Inasmuch as such a position evolves from the Enlightenment 
tradition of human nature and human rights, it inadequately reflects, or 
indeed does not reflect at all, the culture of Third World societies. But there 
is debate among African scholars over this question. Others take the view 
that civil and political freedoms are an absolute necessity within Africa.68 
Indeed, Adegbite goes so far as to assert that the contention that Africans 
have lesser needs for liberty than Europeans is merely another manifestation 
of racism.69 In any case, the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights 
does include a number of the common civil and political freedoms,70 and 
the original Charter of the Organization of African Unity "commits its 
members to support the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights."71 
One might reply, however, that such formalistic recognitions of human 
rights merely represent an intellectually-colonized, elite view of society (in 
theory, if not in practice). What is the evidence that ordinary people will 
value their civil or political freedoms over a "full belly"? The actions and deci- 
sions of ordinary Africans are not normally recorded. Even survey data on 
political participation or basic needs will not necessarily ask the kind of ques- 
tion which will let us know, for example, whether ordinary people would be 
willing to stop reading newspapers in return for a guarantee that they would 
receive twelve yards of new cloth a year, or whether they would be willing 
to stop speaking their ethnic language in return for better access to educa- 
tion. 
One interesting study conducted in Nigeria by Hadley Cantril in the 
67. See, e.g., Asmaron Legesse, "Human Rights in African Political Culture," in Kenneth W. 
Thompson, ed., The Moral Imperatives of Human Rights: A World Survey (Washington, 
D.C.: University Press of America, 1980), 123-37. 
68. See, e.g., K. A. Busia, Africa in Search of Democracy (New York: Praeger, 1967). This 
book was however written before Busia became Prime Minister of Ghana (1969-72). See 
also Aluko, note 60 above, and Emmanuel Omoh Esiemokhai, 'Towards Adequate 
Defence of Human Rights in Africa," Quarterly Journal of Administration 24 (1980), 
451-61. 
69. Latif O. Adegbite, "African Attitudes to the International Protection of Human Rights," in 
Asbjorn Eide and August Schou, eds., Nobel Symposium 7: International Protection of 
Human Rights (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1968), 70-71. 
70. See arts. 2-13 of the Banjul Charter, op. cit. 
71. Aluko, note 60 above, 234. 
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early 1960s discovered that ordinary Nigerians had non-material as well as 
material values. Among their personal aspirations, 41 percent of the 
Nigerian respondents listed a happy family, while 22 percent listed self- 
development, 14 percent congenial work, and 14 percent being useful to 
others. Overall 42 percent mentioned personal values among their aspira- 
tions, while 14 percent mentioned social values. Even taking into account 
that "non-poor" Nigerians were more likely to mention these values than the 
poor,72 not all of the responses can be explained away. Evidence that 
Africans act according to personal values even at very low levels of material 
wealth also comes from the literature on rural-urban migration. In both Tan- 
zania and Kenya, the governments have made attempts to round up unem- 
ployed urban dwellers and return them to the land where they could find 
employment; in both cases, the expelled people have quickly returned to 
the city.73 A major reason for rural-urban migration in Africa appears to be to 
escape the constrictions of community life, even when such constrictions 
offer material security.74 Women, especially, migrate to escape witchcraft 
accusations and unhappy polygynous marriages.75 
A very good example of the willingness to trade off physical security (in 
both senses: both physical integrity and food) for a non-material value is the 
behavior of Jehovah's Witnesses in East Africa. Members of the Watchtower 
society are non-elite Africans seeking to practice a non-traditional religion. 
They come into contact with the authorities primarily because they refuse to 
undergo the relatively formal ceremonies of buying ruling party cards and 
swearing allegiance to the state. As a result, they have suffered discrimina- 
tion in Zambia,76 been banned in Tanzania,77 and been severely persecuted 
in Malawi,78 where youths of the Malawi Congress Party have beatenr them 
and in some cases raped and murdered them and where they have been 
excluded from schools, had their houses burned down, and been forced to 
flee their country. They are a small group of Africans who have been willing 
to trade off economic and physical security for religious freedom. Similarly, 
thousands of the followers of Alice Lenshina, the "Lumpas," fled Zambia in 
72. Hadley Cantril, The Pattern of Human Concerns (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univer- 
sity Press, 1965), 74-81. 
73. See Africa Contemporary Record 3 (1970-71), 8172 for Tanzania. On Kenya, see S.B.U. 
Gutto, "The Status of Women in Kenya," Discussion Paper no. 235, Institute for Develop- 
ment Studies, University of Nairobi (April 1976), 36. 
74. Margaret Peil, Consensus and Conflict in African Societies (London: Longman, 1977), 
278-79. 
75. Christine Obbo, African Women: Their Struggle for Economic Independence (London: 
Zed Press, 1980), 77. 
76. Africa Contemporary Record 2 (1969-70), B232. 
77. David Westerlund, "Freedom of Religion under Socialist Rule in Tanzania, 1961-1977," 
Journal of Church and State 24 (Winter 1982), 95. 
78. Amnesty International, Briefing Paper no. 5, Malawi (London: August 1976). See also 
Tony Hodges, "Jehovah's Witnesses in Central Africa," (London: Minority Rights Group, 
report no. 29, June 1976). 
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the 1960s rather than submit themselves to Kaunda's rule,79 and small sects 
of Christians continue their activities in Tanzania despite having been 
banned for their "anti-developmental" tendencies.80 
Can such religious devotees be dismissed as mere victims of Western 
propaganda (which is, in any case, unlikely in the case of the Lumpas) or do 
they represent a more universal tendency to want the right to live as they see 
fit, to adhere to their own customs and rituals? It is not clear that even the 
right to life overrides all other rights in the actual day-to-day decisions indi- 
viduals make. 
For some individuals, moral integrity is more important than physical 
integrity; indeed, for some, moral integrity is a prerequisite for physical sur- 
vival. Some evidence of this is available from comparative literature on how 
people behave in extremis. Gutman's work on African slaves in the United 
States, for example, demonstrates that, in situations of utter debasement, 
African slaves evolved their own new family structures and moral codes.'8 
Des Pres' work on Jewish survivors of Nazi concentration camps shows how 
those Jews who constructed their own system of social organization within 
the camps managed to survive,82 whereas the demoralized were more likely 
to die.83 Examples of such behavior in Africa are easy to find, as the following 
story shows. The Nigerian novelist Elechi Amadi, suffering from severe 
hunger in a Biafran prison, was offered a bowl of porridge by a guard. He 
asked permission to share it with a fellow-prisoner, a four-year-old girl. 
When permission was denied he threw the food on the floor, rather than eat 
it while depriving the child.84 At certain times, some individuals are willing to 
sacrifice their own basic rights for others' basic rights. Perhaps such 
heroism 85 is necessary to our survival as social beings. 
Examples of such moral integrity abound in Africa. In Uganda, Mrs. 
Teresa Nazire Mukasa-Bukenya, a mathematics lecturer at Makerere Univer- 
sity, was found beheaded on the roadside (she was carrying eight-month 
twins) after she refused to give Idi Amin false information about the sexual 
habits of a Kenyan woman student, information which would have justified 
Amin in claiming to the Kenyan government that the student, rather than 
having been murdered, had merely run off with a group of Ugandan 
soldiers.86 In 1982, three judges were murdered in Ghana, possibly because 
79. Africa Contemporary Record 2 (1969-70), 233 and ibid., 3 (1970-71), B213. 
80. Westerlund, note 77 above, 97. 
81. Herbert Gutman, The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750-1925 (New York: Vin- 
tage Books, 1977). 
82. Terence Des Pres, The Survivor: An Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps (New York: 
Pocket Books, 1976). 
83. Bruno Bettelheim, The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a Mass Age (New York: Avon 
Books, 1960), 121-23. 
84. Elechi Amadi, Sunset in Biafra: A Civil War Diary (London: Heinemann, 1973), 113. 
85. Shue, note 10 above, 116. 
86. Pirouet, note 65 above, 20. See also Africa Contemporary Record 9 (1976-77), B385. 
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they had taken some decisions which the current military dictator, Jerry 
Rawlings, found unpalatable.87 This murder was reminiscent of the dismissal 
of several judges by Kwame Nkrumah in 1963 after they had acquitted a 
number of individuals accused of treason.88 The brave stance taken by the 
Ghana Professional Bodies' Association in the last seven years, against the 
dictatorships of both Acheampong and Rawlings, is further evidence of the 
risks people are willing to take at the expense of both their physical and their 
economic security. The Rawlings regime is actively persecuting profes- 
sionals, calling them "parasites" and "counter-revolutionaries."89 Despite the 
murder of the three judges, only six of Ghana's almost forty Superior Court 
judges have left the country, and none of the remaining judges has 
resigned.90 
Those who are severely critical of the regime in Kenya run substantial 
risks. The populist politician J. M. Kariuki was murdered in 1975, seemingly 
on orders of the chief of the Criminal Investigation Department,9' and 
possibly on the orders of a member of the President's own entourage. The 
radical novelist Ngugi wa Thiong'o spent a year in prison, partly because his 
novel Petals of Blood was based on Kariuki's case, and partly because he 
wrote and produced a play critical of the government in the Kikuyu 
language.92 Since the mid-1970s, three former M.P.'s, George Anyona, 
Martin Shikuku, and John-Marie Seroney have undergone spells of preven- 
tive detention for speaking out, in the ostensible protection of Parliament, 
against corruption and the de facto (now de jure) one-party state.93 One 
former M.P., Chelegat Mutai, has become the first Kenyan refugee in Tan- 
zania.94 In 1982, several prominent Kenyan academics were arrested, and 
the University of Nairobi closed down. Among the arrested was AI-Amin 
Mazrui, still in solitary confinement in May 1983 despite extremely poor 
health.9s 
87. The Legon Observer (Ghana) 14 (July, 1982), 1. 
88. Busia, note 68 above, 106-7. 
89. Association of Professional Bodies, "We Want Government of National Unity," Ghana 
Free Press (29 July 1982). 
90. Statement by Mr. Justice Apaloo, reported in West Africa, "Judicial Challenge [in 
Ghana]," 21 February 1983, 488. 
91. Government of Kenya, "Report of the Select Committee on the Disappearance and 
Murder of the Late Member for Nyandarua North, the Hon. J. M. Kariuki, M.P." (3 June 
1975). 
92. Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Petals of Blood (London: Heinemann, 1977). See also Amnesty Inter- 
national, Bulletin (Canada) (February 1978), Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Detained: A Writer's 
Prison Diary (London: Heinemann, 1981), and also see Africa Contemporary Record 10 
(1977-78), B265. 
93. Amnesty International, Annual Report (1975-76, 1976-77), Bulletin (Canada) Uune and 
September) 1977. 
94. The Sunday News (Tanzania), 31 January 1982, 7. 
95. Amnesty International, Bulletin (Canada) (September 1982 and March 1983); James 
Reid, "Kenyan Academics, Students Victims of Government Purge," CAUT (Canadian 
Association of University Teachers) Bulletin (May 1983), 14. 
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All of these people risked their lives and their physical integrity (Martin 
Shikuku, for example, emerged from prison in 1978 unable to walk96), and 
sacrificed comfortable livelihoods as academics, lawyers, judges, or M.P.'s, in 
order to speak out about injustices which in fact did not affect them in a per- 
sonally severe way. But moral integrity per se does not demand civil/political 
rights; perhaps, indeed, it can thrive in more heroic form when such rights 
are denied. What is important for our purposes is not the quality of the act 
nor the morality of the actor (Martin Shikuku, for instance, was also a strong 
supporter of Amin's expulsions of Asians 97). What is important is that people 
are willing to make sacrifices, both of their physical integrity and of their 
material security, for the sake of a cause in which they believe. Are such 
sacrifices, however, only made by members of the elite who, having been 
raised in relative security, are able to indulge in the relative luxury of critical 
thought? 
The question cannot be answered by existing empirical data. Cantril's 
evidence suggests that ordinary Nigerians value family and personal 
development as well as outright material wealth, but even so, such evidence 
may suggest attachment to traditional communal values rather than indi- 
vidual freedoms. Is it likely that the non-elite will be motivated by the same 
political ideas as the elite? I suggest, following Barrington Moore, that it is.98 
Without indulging in idealism, one can hypothesize that there is a universal 
belief in fairness and justice which permeates all societies. The content of 
what is fair may differ, but all societies have a rule of law and a system of 
legitimating authority. In large-scale, heterogeneous modern societies, an 
efficient means of guaranteeing that law is just and authority legitimate is to 
implement civil and political freedoms which protect the individual against 
abuse of law, and allow the individual effective participation in the choosing 
and operations of government. When non-elite Africans are confronted by 
the centralized modern state, they "need" the same sorts of protections to 
preserve their sense of justice and fairness as the elites "need." Their belief in 
fairness and legitimacy will result in demands for civil and political freedoms 
simultaneously with demands for economic development. Such freedoms 
cannot merely be put aside until all bellies are full. 
V. CONCLUSION: IS THERE A HIERARCHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS? 
A number of attempts have been made to establish a hierarchy of human 
rights or, alternately, a list of basic human rights which cannot be violated 
under any circumstances,99 as opposed to human rights which are of sec- 
96. Amnesty International, Report (1979). See also Ngugi, note 92 above, 102-3. 
97. Tandon, note 61 above, A8, A17. 98. Barrington Moore, Jr., Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (White Plains, 
N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1978), ch. 1, "Recurring Elements in Moral Codes." 
99. See, e.g., Shue, note 10 above; Peter L. Berger, "Are Human Rights Universal?," Com- 
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ondary importance and which may be delayed until economic development 
occurs. In this section, I suggest not a hierarchy, but rather a categorization 
of different kinds of rights. This categorization will show that "basic needs" 
and hence basic "rights" (accepting that basic rights ought to be derived from 
basic needs) are both civil/political and economic/social/cultural in content; 
the separation of the two "kinds" of rights is a false distinction arising out of 
ideological and political disputes.100 
Firstly, it appears that there is a basic right to personal or physical integ- 
rity; in Shue's term, to security and subsistence.101 This right is both political 
and economic in nature. In political terms it means the right to freedom from 
execution and torture, as well as perhaps freedom from arbitrary arrest and 
imprisonment.102 In economic and social terms it means the right to ade- 
quate nutrition and a minimal standard of health care (though there are dif- 
ficulties in defining what such a minimum means; Brockett defines it as 
health care for children 103). The economic right of adequate nutrition has, of 
course, its own political dimension. Nutritional standards are a result as 
much of the distribution as of the ultimate supply of food.104 Similarly health 
care in Africa varies by social class and by urban or rural ocation. In Nigeria, 
for example, there are seventeen times as many doctors and thirteen times 
as many nurses in the capital, Lagos, as in the rural areas; and seven times as 
many doctors and five times as many nurses overall in the urban as in the 
rural area.105 To obtain basic economic rights requires political clout. 
Secondly, there are two kinds of "human dignity" rights which, I believe, 
any person living in a small-scale, communal, non-modern society would 
want, even if (hypothetically) such a person were unconcerned with 
'"Western" individual rights. The first is a right to an historically and culturally 
defined minimum absolute wealth; that is, to a fair share of the community's 
economic resources. Along with this there is the need for the "right of 
belonging" or the right to community; that is, the need to feel secure in one's 
kinship or social system and in one's exercise of custom, ritual, culture; the 
need to feel that those who have power have some legitimacy and are not 
arbitrary.0o6 
mentary 64 (1977), 60-63; Charles Brockett, "A Hierarchy of Human Rights," paper 
presented to the American Political Science Association, 1978 Annual Meeting, New 
York, N.Y. (31 August-3 September 1978). 
100. Especially, according to Shue, out of U.S. pressures for two separate Covenants at the 
U.N., note 10 above, 158. 
101. Ibid., ch. 1. 
102. See Linda J. Maki, "General Principles of Human Rights Law Recognized by all Nations: 
Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention," California Western International Law 
Journal 10 (1980), 272-313. 103. Brockett, note 99 above, 14-15. 
104. See Eicher, note 21 above, also Susan George, How the Other Half Dies: The Real 
Reasons for World Hunger (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976). 
105. A. Mejia, H. Pizurki, and E. Royston, Physician and Nurse Migration: Analysis and Policy 
Implications (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1979), 332. 
106. Moore, note 98 above, 15-31. 
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Thirdly, there are two kinds of rights stressed in the Western political 
tradition but not confined to it: individual civil and political freedoms, and 
socialist equality. As Hodgkin 107 rightly points out, the Western political 
tradition includes socialism as well as liberal capitalism. The socialist ideal is 
that of relative, not absolute, wealth, and is grounded in the belief that 
inequalities of wealth should be eliminated. I believe that relative wealth is 
less important than absolute wealth. As Barrington Moore argues, people do 
not mind economic inequality, so long as they feel that they themselves are 
getting their fair share; that is, equity is more important to them than equal- 
ity.108 Christian Bay agrees: 
The general issue of equality of incomes is not as important as it has been sup- 
posed to be .... First, here must be a right to a minimum income ... enough 
to achieve security for everyone .... Second, there must be a right to equal pay 
for equal work .... [But] [w]hat matters concerning equality is equal respect and 
equal dignity, not the dollars and cents value of equal pay .... What matters is 
not equal treatment .., .what matters is treatment as equals.'09 
This means, for example, that leveling types of economic tactics such as 
practiced in the villagization program in Tanzania may not only be detrimen- 
tal to long-run economic growth, but may also not be in accord with ordi- 
nary people's perceptions of what is wrong with their society. Nyerere's 
statement in 1963 that 
"lTanganyika would reject the creation of a rural class 
system even if it could be proved that it would give the largest overall pro- 
duction increase""o may reflect his own admirable moral principles, but not 
the beliefs of his poverty-stricken countrymen, for whom he ostensibly 
speaks. As long as the inequalities are not so severe as to be "degrading,"'111 
they may be tolerable. 
Similarly, with regard to the Western tradition of civil and political liber- 
ties, people will accept what they consider to be legitimate authority. They 
are not necessarily interested in a leveling or absolute sharing of all political 
power. Legitimation of government through competitive elections within a 
one-party system, as in Tanzania, Zambia, or Kenya may indeed satisfy their 
desires for political input at the national level,112 as long as such elections are 
fairly and freely conducted, and as long as their representatives have a genu- 
107. Thomas L. Hodgkin, "The Relevance of 'Western' Ideas for the New African States," in 
J. Roland Pennock, ed., Self-Government in Modernizing Nations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1965), 51. 
108. Moore, note 98 above, 37-45. 
109. Bay, note 11 above, 70-71 (emphasis in original). 
110. Allan McChesney, "The Promotion of Economic and Political Rights: Two African 
Approaches," Journal of African Law 24 (1980), 168; quotation taken from Nyerere's 
1963 McDougal lecture to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
111. Shue, note 10 above, 119-23. 
112. For a fairly positive assessment of democracy in East African one-party states, see Inter- 
national Commission of Jurists, Human Rights in a One-Party State (London: Search 
Press, 1978). The conditions mentioned do not necessarily obtain, especially in Kenya 
and Zambia. 
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ine right to free speech and criticism. But people are also concerned with a 
right to freedom of social intercourse (assembly and association) and 
speech; they do not want their day-to-day lives interfered with and they 
want the right to speak out on their own as well as through representatives. 
The state which spies on its citizens in a totalitarian manner is therefore more 
oppressive than an elite which merely monopolizes the formal trappings of 
power, without much interference in what ordinary people do or think. (in 
this respect, one wonders if Tanzania's ten-household cell system may be 
regarded as oppressive by its ordinary members. In this system, everyone, 
whether or not a member of the ruling and only political party, is integrated 
into a local structure which allegedly facilitates communication and feed- 
back from the base to the leadership. But in practice, top down communica- 
tion is the norm. Moreover, the cell leader has the duty to urge his or her 
members to pay taxes and join the Party, and to mediate-interfere?- in 
local disputes."3) 
What is important, then, is to remember that the implicit hierarchy of 
human rights contained in the first paradigm of development noted in sec- 
tion II above may not be correct. The "full belly" may not always precede 
moral integrity, the right to community, or political freedom in the value 
system of an individual. Indeed, Bay goes so far as to assert that "many, 
perhaps most, human beings tend to be prepared for extremes of self- 
sacrifice for family, friends, comrades, or a cause."'4 There is no reason to 
think that ordinary Africans have less capacity for moral speculation than 
members of the African or Western elite, although they may have less 
capacity to articulate or act on their beliefs. As an anonymous participant in 
the 1966 Dakar seminar on human rights put it, 'To sacrifice the liberties 
inherent in the human personality in the name of economic development... 
[is] to reduce the individual to the role of producer and consumer of goods, 
which . . [is] far too high a price to pay for improving the material condi- 
tions of existence." 1s 
113. Jean F. O'Barr, "Cell Leaders in Tanzania," African Studies Review 15 (December 1972), 
452, 464, 446, 440. See also McChesney, note 110 above, 191. 
114. Bay, note 11 above, 58. 
115. United Nations, Seminar on Human Rights in Developing Countries, Dakar, 8-22 
February 1966 (New York: United Nations, 1966), 37. 
